Edward Said, “Two Visions in Heart of Darkness”
Culture and Imperialism, (1993) pp. 22-31

This imperial attitude is, I believe, beautifully captured in the complicated and rich narrative form of Conrad's great novella Heart of Darkness, written between 1898 and 1899. On the one hand, the narrator Marlow acknowledges the tragic predicament of all speech—that "it is impossible to convey the life-sensation of any given epoch of one's existence—that which makes its truth, its meaning-its subtle and penetrating essence . . . . We live, as we dream-alone" -yet still manages to convey the enormous power of Kurtz’s African experience through his own overmastering narrative of his voyage into the African interior toward Kurtz. This narrative in turn is connected directly with the redemptive force, as well as the waste and horror, of Europe's mission in the dark world. Whatever is lost or elided or even simply made up in Marlow's immensely compelling recitation is compensated for in the narrative's sheer historical momentum, the temporal forward movement-with digressions, descriptions, exciting encounters, and all. Within the narrative of how he journeyed to Kurtz's Inner Station, whose source and authority he now becomes, Marlow moves backward and forward materially in small and large spirals, very much the way episodes in the course of his journey up-river are then incorporated by the principal forward trajectory into what he renders as "the heart of Africa."

Thus Marlow's encounter with the improbably white-suited clerk in the middle of the jungle furnishes him with several digressive paragraphs, as does his meeting after with the semi-crazed, harlequin-like Russian who has been so affected by Kurtz's gifts. Yet underlying Marlow's inconclusiveness, his evasions, his arabesque meditations on his feelings and ideas, is the unrelenting course of the journey itself, which, despite all the many obstacles, is sustained through the jungle, through time, through hardship, to the heart of it all, Kurtz's ivory-trading empire. Conrad wants us to see how Kurtz's great looting adventure, Marlow's journey up the river, and the narrative itself all share a common theme: Europeans performing acts of imperial mastery and will in (or about) Africa.

What makes Conrad different from the other colonial writers who were his contemporaries is that, for reasons having partly to do with the colonialism that turned him, a Polish expatriate, into an employee of the imperial system, he was so self-conscious about what he did. Like most of his other tales, therefore, Heart of Darkness cannot just be a straightforward recital of Marlow's adventures: it is also a dramatization of Marlow himself, the former wanderer in colonial regions, telling his story to a group of British listeners at a particular time and in a specific place. That this group of people is drawn largely from the business world is Conrad's way of emphasizing the fact that during the 1890S the business of empire, once an ad\venturous and often individualistic enterprise, had become the empire of business. (Coincidentally we should note that at about the same time Halford Mackinder, an explorer, geographer, and Liberal Imperialist gave a series of lectures on imperialism at the London Institute of Bankers perhaps Conrad knew about this.) Although the almost oppressive force of Marlow's narrative
leaves us with a quite accurate sense that there is no way out of the sovereign historical force of imperialism, and that it has the power of a system representing as well as speaking for everything within its dominion, Conrad shows us that what Marlow does is contingent, acted out for a set of like-minded British hearers, and limited to that situation.

Yet neither Conrad nor Marlow gives us a full view of what is outside the world-conquering attitudes embodied by Kurtz, Marlow, the circle of listeners on the deck of the Nellie~, and Conrad. By that I mean that *Heart of Darkness* works so effectively because its politics and aesthetics are, so to speak, imperialist, which in the closing years of the nineteenth century seemed to be at the same time an aesthetic, politics, and even epistemology inevitable and unavoidable. For if we cannot truly understand someone else's experience and if we must therefore depend upon the assertive authority of the sort of power that Kurtz wields as a white man in the jungle or that Marlow, another white man, wields as narrator, there is no use looking for other, non-imperialist alternatives; the system has simply eliminated them and made them unthinkable. The circularity, the perfect closure of the whole thing is not only aesthetically but also mentally unassailable.

Conrad is so self-conscious about situating Marlow's tale in a narrative moment that he allows us simultaneously to realize after all that imperialism, far from swallowing up its own history, was taking place in and was circumscribed by a larger history, one just outside the tightly inclusive circle of Europeans on the deck of the Nellie. As yet, however, no one seemed to inhabit that region, and so Conrad left it empty.

Conrad could probably never- have used Marlow to present anything other than an imperialist world-view, given what was available for either Conrad or Marlow to see of the non-European at the time. Independence was for whites and Europeans; the lesser or subject peoples were to be ruled; science, learning, history emanated from the West. True, Conrad scrupulously recorded the differences between the disgraces of Belgian and British colonial attitudes, but he could only imagine the world carved up into one or another Western sphere of dominion. But because Conrad also had an extraordinarily persistent residual sense of his own exilic marginality, he quite carefully (some would say maddeningly) qualified Marlow's narrative with the provisionality that came from standing at the very juncture of this world with another, unspecified but different. Conrad was certainly not a great imperialist entrepreneur like Cecil Rhodes or Frederick Lugard, even though he understood perfectly how for each of them, in Hannah Arendt's words, to enter "the maelstrom of an unending process of expansion, he will, as it were, cease to be what he was and obey the laws of the process, identify himself with anonymous forces that he is supposed to serve in order to keep the whole process in motion, he will think of himself as mere function, and eventually consider such functionality, such an incarnation of the dynamic trend, his highest possible achievement." Conrad's realization is that if, like narrative, imperialism has monopolized the entire system of representation—which in the case of *Heart of Darkness* allowed it to speak for Africans as well as for Kurtz and the Other adventurers, including Marlow and his audience-your self-consciousness as an outsider can allow you actively to comprehend how the machine works, given that you and it are fundamentally not in perfect synchrony or correspondence. Never the wholly
incorporated and fully acculturated Englishman, Conrad therefore preserved an ironic
distance in each of his works.

The form of Conrad's narrative has thus made it possible to derive two possible
arguments, two visions, in the post-colonial world that succeeded his. One argument
allows the old imperial enterprise full scope to play itself out conventionally, to render
the world as official European or Western imperialism saw it, and to consolidate itself
after World War Two. Westerners may have physically left their old colonies in Africa
and Asia, but they retained them not only as markets but as locales on the ideological
map over which they continued to rule morally and intellectually. "Show me the Zulu
Tolstoy," as one American intellectual has recently put it. The assertive sovereign
inclusiveness of this argument courses through the words of those who speak today for
the West and for what the West did, as well as for what the rest of the world is, was, and
may be. The assertions of this discourse exclude what has been represented as "lost" by
arguing that the colonial world was in some ways ontologically speaking lost to begin
with, irredeemable, irrecusably inferior. Moreover, it focuses not on what was shared in
the colonial experience, but on what must never be shared, namely the authority and
rectitude that come with greater power and development Rhetorically, its terms are the
organization of political passions, to borrow from Julien Benda's critique of modern
intellectuals, terms which, he was~ sensible enough to know, lead inevitably to mass
slaughter, and if not to literal mass slaughter then certainly to rhetorical slaughter.

The second argument is considerably less objectionable. It sees itself a~ Conrad saw his
own narratives, local to a time and place, neither unconditionally true nor unqualifiedly
certain. As I have said, Conrad does not give us the sense that he could imagine a fully
realized alternative to imperialism the natives he wrote about in Africa, Asia, or America
were incapable of independence, and because he seemed to imagine that European
 tutelage was a given, he could not foresee what would take place when it came to at end.
But come to an end it would, if only because -like all human effort, like speech itself- it
would have its moment, then it would have to pass, Since Conrad dates imperialism,
shows its contingency, records its illusions and tremendous violence and waste (as in
Nostromo), he permits his later readers to imagine something other than an Africa carved
up into dozens of European colonies, even if, for his own pan, he had little notion of what
that Africa might be.

To return to the first line out of Conrad, the discourse of resurgent empire proves that the
nineteenth-century imperial encounter continues today to draw lines and defend barriers.
Strangely, it persists also in the enormously complex and quietly interesting interchange
between former colonial partners, say between Britain and India, or between France and
the Francophone countries of Africa. But these exchanges tend to be overshadowed by
the loud antagonisms of the polarized debate of pro- and anti-imperialists, who speak
stridently of national destiny, overseas interests, neo-imperialism, and the like, drawing
like-minded people-aggressive Westerners and, ironically, those non-Westerners for
whom the new nationalist and resurgent Ayatollahs speak-away from the other ongoing
interchange. Inside each regrettably constricted camp stand the blameless, the just, the
faithful, led by the omnicompetent, those who know the truth about themselves and
others; outside stands a miscellaneous bunch of querulous intellectuals and wishy-washy skeptics who go on complaining about the past to little effect.

An important ideological shift occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, accompanying this contraction of horizons in what I have been calling the first of the two lines leading out of *Heart of Darkness*. One can locate it, for instance, in the dramatic change in emphasis and, quite literally, direction among thinkers noted for their radicalism. The later Jean-François Lyotard and Michel Foucault, eminent French philosophers who emerged during the 1960s as apostles of radicalism and intellectual insurgency, describe a striking new lack of faith in what Lyotard calls the great legitimizing narratives of emancipation and enlightenment. Our age, he said in the 1980s, is postmodernist, concerned only with local issues, not with history but with problems to be solved, not with a grand reality but with games. Foucault also turned his attention away from the oppositional forces in modern society which he had studied for their undeterred resistance to exclusion and confinement—delinquents, poets, outcasts, and the like—and decided that since power was everywhere it was probably better to concentrate on the local micro-physics of power that surround the individual. The self was therefore to be studied, cultivated, and, if necessary, refashioned and constituted. In both Lyotard and Foucault we find precisely the same trope employed to explain the disappointment in the politics of liberation: narrative, which posits an enabling beginning point and a vindicating goal, is no longer adequate for plotting the human trajectory in society. There is nothing to look forward to: we are stuck within our circle. And now the line is enclosed by a circle. After years of support for anti-colonial struggles in Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, Palestine, Iran, which came to represent for many Western intellectuals their deepest engagement in the politics and philosophy of anti-imperialist decolonization, a moment of exhaustion and disappointment was reached. One began to hear and read how futile it was to support revolutions, how barbaric were the new regimes that came to power, how this is an extreme case--decolonization had benefited "world communism."

Enter now terrorism and barbarism. Enter also the ex-colonial experts whose well-publicized message was these colonial peoples deserve only colonialism or, since "we" were foolish to pull out of Aden, Algeria, India, Indochina, and everywhere else, it might be a good idea to reinvoke their territories. Enter also various experts and theoreticians of the relationship between liberation movements, terrorism, and the KGB. There was a resurgence of sympathy for what Jeane Kirkpatrick called authoritarian (as opposed to totalitarian) regimes who were Western allies. With the onset of Reaganism, Thatcherism, and their correlates, a new phase of history began.

However else it might have been historically understandable, peremptorily withdrawing "the West" from its own experiences in the "peripheral world" certainly was and is not an attractive or edifying activity for an intellectual today. It shuts out the possibility of knowledge and of discovery of what it means to be outside the whale. Let us return to Rushdie for another insight:

> We see that it can be as false to create a politics-free fictional universe as to create one in which nobody needs to work or eat or hate or love or sleep. Outside the whale it becomes necessary, and even exhilarating, to grapple with the special problems created by the incorporation of
political material, because politics is by turns farce and tragedy, and sometimes (e.g., Zia's Pakistan) both at once. Outside the whale the writer is obliged to accept that he (or she) is part of the crowd, part of the ocean, part of the storm, so that objectivity becomes a great dream, like perfection, an unattainable goal for which one must struggle in spite of the impossibility of success. Outside the whale is the world of Samuel Beckett's famous formula: I can't go on, I'll go on.

The terms of Rushdie's description, while they borrow from Orwell, seem to me to resonate even more interestingly with Conrad. For here is the second consequence, the second line leading out of Conrad's narrative form; in its explicit references to the outside, it points to a perspective outside the basically imperialist representations provided by Marlow and his listeners. It is a profoundly secular perspective, and it is beholden neither to notions about historical destiny and the essentialism that destiny always seems to entail, nor to historical indifference and resignation. Being on the inside shuts out the full experience of imperialism, edits it and subordinates it to the dominance of one Eurocentric and totalizing view; this other perspective suggests the presence of a field without special historical privileges for one party.

I don't want to overinterpret Rushdie, or put ideas in his prose that he may not have intended. In this controversy with the local British media (before The Satanic Verses sent him into hiding), he claimed that he could not recognize the truth of his own experience in the popular media representations of India. Now I myself would go further and say that it is one of the virtues of such conjunctures of politics with culture and aesthetics that they permit the disclosure of a common ground obscured by the controversy itself (Perhaps it is especially hard for the combatants directly involved to see this common ground when they are fighting back more than reflecting. I can perfectly understand the anger that fuelled Rushdie's argument because like him I feel outnumbered and outorganized by a prevailing Western consensus that has come to regard the Third World as an atrocious nuisance, a culturally and politically inferior place. Whereas we write and speak as members of a small minority of marginal voices, our journalistic and academic critics belong to a wealthy system of interlocking informational and academic resources with newspapers, television networks, journals of opinion, and institutes at its disposal. Most of them have now taken up a strident chorus of rightward-tending damnation, in which they separate what is non-white, non-Western, and non-Judeo-Christian from the acceptable and designated Western ethos, then herd it all together under various demeaning rubrics such as terrorist, marginal, second-race, or unimportant To attack what is contained in these categories is to defend the Western spirit.

Let us return to Conrad and to what I have been referring to as the second, less imperialistically assertive possibility offered by Heart of Darkness. Recall once again that Conrad sets the Story on the deck of a boat anchored in the Thames as Marlow tells his story the sunsets, and by the end of the narrative the heart of darkness has reappeared in England; outside the group of Marlow's listeners lies an undefined and unclear world. Conrad some times seems to want to fold that world into the imperial metropolitan discourse represented by Marlow, but by virtue of his own dislocated subjectivity he resists the effort and succeeds in so doing, I hue always believed, largely through formal devices. Conrad's self-consciously circular narrative forms draw attention to themselves
as artificial constructions, encouraging us to sense the potential of a reality that seemed inaccessible to imperialism, just beyond its control, and that only well after Conrad's death in 1914 acquired a substantial presence.

This needs more explanation. Despite their European names and mannerisms, Conrad's narrators are not average unreflecting witnesses of European imperialism. They do not simply accept what goes on in the name of the imperial idea: they think about it a lot, they worry about it, they are actually quite anxious about whether they can make it seem like a routine thing. But it never is. Conrad's way of demonstrating this discrepancy between the orthodox and his own views of empire is to keep drawing attention to how ideas and values are constructed (and deconstructed) through dislocations in the narrator's language. In addition, the recitations are meticulously staged: the narrator is a speaker whose audience and the reason for their being together, the quality of whose voice, the effect of what he says-are all important and even insistent aspects of the story he tells.

Marlow, for example, is never straightforward. He alternates between garrulity and stunning eloquence, and rarely resists making peculiar things seem more peculiar by surprisingly misstating them, or rendering them vague and contradictory. Thus, he says, a French warship fires "into a continent"; Kurtz's eloquence is enlightening as well as fraudulent; and so on-his speech so full of these odd discrepancies (well discussed by Ian Wan as "delayed decoding") that the net effect is to leave his immediate audience as well as the reader with the acute sense that what he is presenting is not quite as it should be or appears to be.

Yet the whole point of what Kurtz and Marlow talk about is in fact imperial mastery, white European over black Africans, and their ivory, civilization over the primitive dark continent. By accentuating the discrepancy between the official "idea" of empire and the remarkably disorienting actuality of Africa, Marlow unsettles the reader's sense not only of the very idea of empire, but of something more basic, reality itself. For if Conrad can show that all human activity depends on controlling a radically unstable reality to which words approximate only by will or convention, the same is true of empire, of venerating the idea, and so forth. With Conrad, then, we are in a world being made and unmade more or less all the time. What appears stable and secure--the policeman at the corner, for instance--is only slightly more secure than the white men in the jungle, and requires the same continuous (but precarious) triumph over an all-pervading darkness, which by the end of the tale is shown to be the same in London and in Africa.

Conrad's genius allowed him to realize that the ever-present darkness could be colonized or illuminated-Heart of Darkness is full of references to the mission civilisatrice, to benevolent as well as cruel schemes to bring light to the dark places and peoples of this world by acts of will and deployments of power-but that it also had to be acknowledged as independent. Kurtz and Marlow acknowledge the darkness, the former as he is dying, the latter as he reflects retrospectively on the meaning of Kurtz's final words. They (and of course Conrad) are ahead of their time in understanding that what they call "the darkness" has an autonomy of its own, and can reinvade and reclaim what imperialism had taken for its own. But Marlow and Kurtz are also creatures of their time and cannot take the next step, which would be to recognize that what they saw, disabilingly and
disparagingly, as a non-European "darkness" was in fact a non-European world resisting
imperialism so as one day to regain sovereignty and independence, and not, as Conrad
reductively says, to reestablish the darkness. Conrad's tragic limitation is that even
though he could see clearly that on one level imperialism was essentially pure dominance
and land-grabbing, he could not then conclude that imperialism had to end so that
"natives" could lead lives free from European domination. As a creature of his rime,
Conrad could not grant the natives their freedom, despite his severe critique of the
imperialism that enslaved them.

The cultural and ideological evidence that Conrad was wrong in his Eurocentric way is
both impressive and rich. A whole movement, literature, and theory of resistance and
response to empire exists-it is the subject of Chapter Three of this book-and in greatly
disparate post-colonial regions one sees tremendously energetic efforts to engage with the
metropolitan world in equal debate so as to testify to the diversity and differences of the
non-European world and to its own agendas, priorities, and history. The purpose of this
testimony is to inscribe, reinterpret, and expand the areas of engagement as well as the
terrain contested with Europe. Some of this activity-for example, the work of two
important and active Iranian intellectuals, Ali Sharia, i and Jalal Ali i-Ahmed, who by
means of speeches, books, tapes, and pamphlets prepared the way for the Islamic
Revolution interprets colonialism by asserting the absolute opposition of the native
culture: the \Vest is an enemy, a disease, an evil In Other instances, novelists like the
Kenyan Ngugi and, he Sudanese Tayeb Salih appropriate for, heir fiction such great topoi
of colonial culture as the quest and the voyage into the unknown, claiming them for their
own, post-colonial purposes. Salih's hero in Season of Migration to the North does (and
is) the reverse of what Kurtz does (and is): the Black man journeys north into white
territory.

Between classical nineteenth-century imperialism and what it gave rise to in resistant
native cultures, there is thus both a stubborn confrontation and a crossing over in
discussion, borrowing back and forth, debate. Many of the most interesting post-colonial
writers bear their past within them-as scars of humiliating wounds, as instigation for
different practices, as potentially revised visions of the past tending toward a new future,
as urgently reinterpretable and redeploy able experiences, in which the formerly silent
native speaks and acts on territory taken back from the empire. One sees these aspects in
Rushdie, Derek Walcott, Aimé Cesaire, Chinua Achebe, Pablo Neruda, and Brian Friel.
And now these writers can truly read the great colonial masterpieces, which not only
misrepresented them but assumed they were unable to read and respond directly to what
had been written about them, just as European ethnography presumed the natives' incapacity to intervene in scientific discourse about them.